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I
INTRODUCTION
As a commentator, one is usually expected to analyze a principal author's
article, perhaps to bring new insights to the subject, and in most cases to point
out areas in which the commentator might disagree with the author's analysis
or conclusions and present counter-arguments and conclusions. I shall have to
depart from that model in this comment, for I find myself in agreement with
almost everything that Professor Donoghue has said in her excellent article.'
I am, however, intrigued by the subtle change of emphasis that Ms. Donoghue
has provided for our discussion. The title given to our panel by the organizer
of the symposium was "Foreign Sovereign Immunity: The Case for a New
Treaty." Joan Donoghue's subtitle is "Prospects for a Convention on Foreign
State Immunity." The hidden message I get from this subtitle, and it is borne
out in the article, is that not much of a case can be made for a new treaty. If
I read her correctly, she argues that, at least from the standpoint of advancing
U.S. interests, now is an unpropitious time to attempt to move toward an
international convention dealing generally with the substantive law of state
immunity. She suggests that a small group of like-minded states (primarily
European), including the newly liberated Eastern states that appear to be
moving toward market economies, might achieve some common objectives in
a convention that would focus primarily on procedural issues,2 perhaps along
the lines suggested by Peter Trooboff in his Hague lectures in 1986.3 As she
also points out, this is not what is really needed. Although there are some
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differences in the state immunity doctrines of these "like-minded states," the
major differences in doctrine now occur between the industrialized "North" on
the one hand and the developing "South" on the other, and, in the words of Ms.
Donoghue, these disagreements are "no less contentious than the former East-
West polemics."4 In my view, unless there is a reasonable prospect of resolving
these differences, the prospects for, and the desirability of, supporting efforts to
negotiate an international convention on state immunity are small.
II
NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS
The difficulty is that even assuming that the principle of restrictive state
immunity has replaced that of absolute immunity,5 the principle has no clearly
defined content nor coherent rationale.6 From my experience in the law of the
sea, I am reminded of the development of the concept of the exclusive economic
zone ("EEZ"). Although it generally came to be recognized by the late 1970s,
and certainly by the early 1980s, that the concept of an EEZ had become a part
of customary international law,7 it was not until the conclusion of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 19828 that the EEZ, one of the
most important components of this Convention, was given a coherent identity
and content. Although the maritime states and the territorialist states started
out poles apart in negotiating the EEZ, they were ultimately able to reach
agreement only because each side was willing to make concessions significant
to the other in return for obtaining objectives significant to themselves. The
maritime states were willing to accept coastal state jurisdiction over economic
resources out to two hundred miles from the coast in return for stabilization of
the limits of the territorial sea at twelve miles with guaranteed passage through
international straits.9 For the present, at least, there seems to be no corre-
sponding basis-no similar quid pro quo-for agreement on state immunity
between North and South.
For any state, there are three prerequisites to successful international
negotiations leading to a multilateral treaty. The first prerequisite is clearly
defined negotiating objectives which the state hopes to achieve from the
negotiations. The second prerequisite is a coherent strategy to attain these
objectives. The third is a reasonable prospect of success in the negotiations. I
4. Donoghue, supra note 1, at 322.
5. This assumption is by no means universally accepted. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (4th ed. 1990).
6. See James Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT'L
L. 820, 854-55 (1981).
7. See BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW
OF THE SEA 27-28 (1989) (and authorities cited therein).
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, official text contained in
United Nations Publication Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983). The Convention will enter into force on
November 16, 1994, one year after the 60th ratification was deposited.
9. See Tommy T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA xxxii (U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 1983).
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see problems for the United States in all three areas with respect to a universal
agreement on state immunity.
As to the first, I can perceive no consensus in the United States as to what
the objectives might be. There is a substantial gulf between the international
business community and the private bar of the United States on the one hand
and the national government on the other as to a number of issues concerning
state immunity. The differences were illustrated in the positions of government
and private witnesses in the hearings before the House and Senate on the
American Bar Association proposals for amendments to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (the "FSIA") in 1987 and 1988.10 In view of these differences,
I doubt that the United States could come up with an agreed negotiating
position on a number of issues that would be likely to succeed in an internation-
al negotiation. Although the Department of State could unilaterally establish
a U.S. position, unless it was acceptable to the private bar, this action might
create later difficulties in the ratification of any agreement reached.
As to the second prerequisite-a negotiating strategy-this is, of course,
impossible without consensus on negotiating objectives, so I will leave this topic
without further comment.
As to the third prerequisite-reasonable prospect of success-again, without
clear-cut objectives, one cannot really estimate the odds of success. Assuming
for the purpose of our discussion, however, that the U.S. goal would be to
obtain an international agreement that resembles in major respects the FSIA,"
I see no reasonable prospect that such goals could be achieved. To illustrate,
I will take several key provisions of the FSIA and contrast them with the
provisions of the International Law Commission (the "ILC") draft articles on
the same subject.12 Although there are other models for an international
convention on sovereign immunity, 3 the one most likely to serve as a model
for an international negotiation is the ILC Draft Articles. Reflecting the
10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings on H.R. 3763 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on H.R. 3763]; Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Hearings on H.R. 1149, H.R. 1689 and H.R. 1888 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987).
11. United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(b), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988)) [hereinafter FSIA].
Although some provisions of the FSIA have engendered confusion in the courts and considerable
criticisms and calls for reform among publicists (see, e.g., Donoghue, supra note 1, at 307-15), there is
no consensus as to what form the changes should take. Some minor amendments have been made to
FSIA since its enactment in 1976. Pub. L. No. 100-640, 102 Stat. 3333 (1988) (admiralty jurisdiction);
Pub. L. No. 100-669, 102 Stat. 3969 (1988) (enforcement of commercial arbitration decisions); Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5121 (1990) (technical amendments). But the basic substance and structure of
the statute are unchanged, and major ambiguities and sources of confusion remain as originally enacted.
12. Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their property: Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/46/10 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 ILC DRAFT ARTICLES].
13. See, e.g., European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972);
Organization of American States, Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States,
Jan. 21, 1983,22 I.L.M. 292 (1983); International Law Association, Draft Convention on State Immunity,
Sept. 9, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 287 (1983).
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accommodations and compromises that were necessary in the Commission to get
agreement on the text, the ILC draft will probably be the initial text which will
establish the framework for any negotiation that may eventually occur.
III
PROBLEMS WITH THE ILC DRAFT CONVENTION
In the Sixth Committee deliberations on the ILC Draft Articles in the 1991
Session of the General Assembly, of the twenty-six speakers who addressed the
issue, an overwhelming majority (twenty) favored convening an international
conference to negotiate an international convention on state immunity based on
the ILC Draft Articles. Although the General Assembly, on the recommenda-
tion of the Sixth Committee, decided not to convene an international conference
at that time, deciding instead to establish an "open-ended working group of the
Sixth Committee" to examine further the issues of substance, such examination
was to "facilitate a successful conclusion of a convention."' 4 The report of this
working group included a number of suggestions for substantive changes to the
text of the ILC draft, which will be discussed below. But rather than
recommending an early convening of an international conference on state
immunity, the working group recommended setting aside two weeks ("at least
ten to twelve meetings") at the start of the forty-eighth session of the General
Assembly (1993-94) for additional concentrated work on substantive issues."5
As a result, the Sixth Committee recommended, and the General Assembly
adopted, a decision which proposed the reestablishment of the Working Group
during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly "to continue
consideration of the same issues in order to facilitate the successful conclusion
of a convention through the promotion of general agreement."16
IV
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ILC DRAFT CONVENTION AND THE FSIA
First among the differences between the FSIA and the ILC Draft Articles
are their approaches to what constitutes a commercial activity. The FSIA
provides that whether a governmental activity is commercial or noncommercial
is to be determined by the nature of the activity and not its purpose. Although
there had been some wavering from this standard among lower federal courts,
the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Republic of
14. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Comm., 43d Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/46/L.15 (1991).
15. Report of the Working Group on Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/47/L.10 (1992) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP
REPORT].
16. Report of the Sixth Committee on Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/47/585 (1992). Resolutions and Decisions
Adopted by the General Assembly During its Forty-Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 43d Sess.,
at 106, U.N. Doc. A/INF./47/8 (1992).
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Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,17 has reined in the lower courts on this issue. It is
now clear that the U.S. doctrine on this issue, as laid out in the FSIA and as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, is that the nature of the act rather than its
purpose governs. The ILC draft, on the other hand, provides:
In determining whether a contract or transaction is a 'commercial transaction' ...
reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but
its purpose should also be taken into account if, in the practice of the State which is
a party to it, that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of
the contract or transaction.
In its comment on this paragraph, the ILC explains that this two-pronged test
was adopted "to provide an adequate safeguard and protection for developing
countries, especially in their endeavours to promote national economic
development."19 As examples of when the purpose of the transaction might
govern, transforming a transaction that on its face is commercial to one that is
sovereign (and thus immune), the ILC mentions "the procurement of food
supplies to feed a population, relieve a famine situation or revitalize a
vulnerable area, or supply medicaments to combat a spreading epidemic,
provided that it is the practice of that State to conclude such contracts or
transactions for such public ends."2 Under this test and by analogy to these
examples, almost any transaction could be held to be noncommercial, since no
state purports to act except for "public ends."
Recognizing the potential that the ILC draft had for "subjective interpreta-
tions as to the practice of the defendant State" and for the purpose of "reducing
the risk that private parties might be placed in an uncertain and disadvanta-
geous position," the Working Group Report recommended that the provision
now contained in the commentary be incorporated into the text of paragraph
2 of article 2 itself as follows:
In determining whether a contract or transaction is a commercial transaction under
paragraph 1 (c), reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or
transaction, but in the exceptional circumstances where the contract or transaction is
made for the purpose of humanitarian assistance including the procurement of food
supplies to relieve a famine situation or the supply of medicaments to combat a
spreading epidemic, such a contract or transaction may be regarded as non-commer-
cial.21
According to the Working Group Report, the proposed reformulation would
give "less leeway" for subjective interpretations. 22 Whether this change would
have the predicted effect is open to debate since the use of the word "including"
seems to leave the list merely illustrative and open-ended.
Despite the difficulties in applying the "nature of the transaction" test (and
Professor Donoghue has referred to them in her principal article and developed
17. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992). See also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
18. 1991 ILC DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 12, art. 2, 1 2.
19. Id. at 30 (commentary).
20. Id.
21. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
22. Id.
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them in more detail in her recent Yale Journal of International Law article'),
that test is firmly embedded in U.S. statutory law and departure from it would
undermine one of the main features of that law.
The so-called "nexus" issue is a second area of difference. Both the FSIA
and the ILC draft require a certain nexus between the act or activity upon
which a suit is based and the forum state in order to create an exception to the
immunity of the foreign state. This "nexus" requirement is explicit in the torts
provisions of both instruments, but only the FSIA makes this requirement
explicit with respect to the commercial transaction exception to immunity.
With respect to tort liability, the FSIA provides that the foreign state shall
not be immune in cases of personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of,
property "occurring in the United States."24 Under this provision, the injury
or harm must be suffered in the United States, although the statute is silent as
to whether the tortious act or omission must also take place in the territory of
the United States. Relying on the legislative history,25 three federal courts of
appeals have held that the tortious act or omission must also have taken place
in the United States.26 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States takes the position that only the injury must take place in the
United States; the tortious act or omission may occur elsewhere provided the
injury is a direct result of the tortious act or omission.27 The ILC draft
requires explicitly that the act or omission occur "in whole or in part in the
territory of [the forum State] and [that] the author of the act or omission [be]
present in that territory at the time of the act or omission."' This difference
in approach is unlikely to be resolved in an international negotiation because
the sentiment in the United States seems to be for loosening rather than
tightening the required nexus between the territory of the forum state and the
wrongful act or resulting harm.29 In the Working Group of the Sixth Commit-
tee, there was some sentiment for deleting article 12 in its entirety,30 but the
nexus question was not addressed.
23. Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A
Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 499-512 (1992).
24. FSIA, supra note 11, § 1605(a)(5).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976); S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6619.
26. Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Olsen by Sheldon v. Mex., 729 F.2d 641 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984); Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 454 cmt.
e, r.n. 1 (1987).
28. 1991 ILC DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 12, art. 12. The immunity acts of the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia, as well as the European Convention, also explicitly require that the tortious act
or omission occur within the forum state. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 5 (U.K.), reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 1123, 1125 (1978) [hereinafter U.K. Immunity Act; Act to Provide for State Immunity in
Canadian Courts, July 15, 1982, ch. 95, § 6 (Can.), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798, 799 (1985) [hereinafter
Canadian Immunity Act]; Foreign States Immunities Act, 1985, Dec. 16, 1985, § 13 (Austl.), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 715, 719 (1986) [hereinafter Australian Immunities Act]; European Convention on State
Immunity, supra note 13, art. 11.
29. See Donoghue, supra note 1, at 311 n.25.
30. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 17.
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For commercial transactions, the FSIA's provision is similar to traditional
U.S. law as to the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over absent defendants,
providing that the foreign state shall not be immune as to "a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States."31 This provision, when tied to the
first section of the FSIA,32 which links personal jurisdiction to a determination
that the defendant state is not immune under the Act, is one of the most
ambiguous and confusing aspects of the U.S. statutory scheme. The ILC
provision, on the other hand, has no explicit nexus provision, leaving that to the
determination of the court's jurisdiction under the "applicable rules of private
international law."33 The Commentary to Article 10 explains this provision:
It is common ground among the various approaches to the study of State immunities
that there must be a pre-existing jurisdiction in the courts of the foreign State before
the possibility of its exercise arises and that such jurisdiction can only exist and its
exercise only be authorized in conformity with the internal law of the State of the
forum, including the applicable rules of jurisdiction, particularly where there is a
foreign element involved in a dispute or differences that require settlement or
adjudication.'
Although my personal view is that the ILC approach is the preferable one and
would certainly be an improvement over the muddled U.S. statute, it is
questionable whether this change would be acceptable to the United States.
The third and final problem I shall mention is that of enforcement. It is
probably here that there is the greatest difference between the approaches of
the United States and a number of other states, particularly developing ones.
I think it is common ground that there is a difference between denying
immunity to a foreign state in order to adjudicate a controversy between a
private person and that state on the one hand and the seizure of or execution
upon that state's property either before or after a judgment on the other. (The
ILC draft refers to these measures as "measures of constraint."3 ) All of the
national statutes I have examined have recognized this dichotomy. 6 Until the
adoption of the FSIA, U.S. law did not allow any execution upon foreign state
property following judgment but did, under certain circumstances, allow
31. FSIA, supra note 11, § 1605(a)(2).
32. Id. § 1330.
33. 1991 ILC DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 12, art. 10, 1 1.
34. Id. art. 10, 4 (commentary).
35. Id. art. 10.
36. FSIA, supra note 11, § 1609; U.K. Immunity Act, supra note 28, § 13(1)(b); Canadaian
Immunity Act, supra note 28, § 11; Australian Immunities Act, supra note 28, pt. IV. For a
comprehensive review of state legislation and practice, see ILC Special Rapporteur, Seventh Report
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, U.N. Doc. AJCN.4/388, 47-64 (1985), reprinted in 2 1985 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW COMMISSION 31-33 (1985) (Part I).
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attachment of property for purposes of in rem jurisdiction.37 The FSIA
reversed that scheme, allowing prejudgment attachment only with the explicit
consent of the foreign state, but allowing execution on certain categories of
foreign state property to satisfy a judgment.38  As evidenced by the 1988
hearings on amendments to the FSIA, there is significant support in the United
States for broadening the types of property subject to such execution. On the
other hand, the ILC draft, reflecting primarily the sensitivities of the developing
states and their extreme concern with protection of their "sovereign" rights,
takes a much more conservative position on "measures of constraint." Its
provisions, which apply both to pretrial and prejudgment restraint as well as to
measures in satisfaction of a judgment, allow attachment, arrest, or execution
of government property in only three circumstances: (1) where the state has
expressly consented; (2) where the state has allocated or earmarked property for
the satisfaction of the claim which is the subject of the proceeding; or (3) where
the property is "specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other
than government noncommercial purposes and is in the territory of the State of
the forum and has a connection with the claim which is the object of the
proceeding or with the agency or instrumentality against which the proceeding
was directed."'  These narrow exceptions to immunity from execution are
unlikely to satisfy U.S. interests, and any departure from them is likely to be
strongly opposed by developing states.
It should be noted, however, that the Open-Ended Working Group to the
Sixth Committee recognized the extreme narrowness of the ILC provision on
measures of constraint and made certain proposals for modification which it said
were "intended to strike a balance between the position of those for whom only
commercial State property having a link with the underlying claim or with the
agency or instrumentality concerned should be subject to measures of constraint
and the position of those who object to the requirement of such a link."'41
V
CONCLUSION
There are, of course, other controversial provisions in the ILC Draft
Articles. I have selected only three issues for discussion in view of their
importance to the overall scheme set forth in the articles. Should an interna-
tional negotiation eventually occur, I am sure that these issues will pose
significant difficulties to the successful conclusion of a generally acceptable
agreement. On the other hand, if no international negotiations for a treaty on
foreign state immunity take place-as Ms. Donoghue suggests is the more likely
37. United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, H. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6626.
38. FSIA, supra note 11, § 1610.
39. See Senate Hearings on H.R. 3763, supra note 10.
40. 1991 ILC DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 12, art. 18, 1.
41. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 12.
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outcome of current discussions-these same issues will undoubtedly continue to
simmer as states continue their differing practices as to questions of state
immunity.

